I. Introduction
Utilization of divestiture as an antitrust remedy in bank mergers grew out of the merger movement of the 1970s. One of the more disturbing aspects of that merger movement, from the standpoint of the banking community, was the high degree of uncertainty regarding regulatory views as to which mergers would constitute antitrust violations. During the early 1980's, the bank regulatory agencies began to take measures to eliminate the high degree of uncertainty regarding the acceptability of merger proposals under the antitrust laws. The first step was adoption of the numerical merger guidelines published by the Department of Justice. It thus became possible for applicants to identify mergers that would likely raise competitive issues or precipitate a lawsuit by the Department.
Once the banking community had attained the means to identify problematic mergers, some device more certain than the use of generally accepted mitigating factors was needed to reduce, if not eliminate, any uncertainty regarding approval of proposed mergers. It soon became evident that relatively modest divestitures could, in most instances, be used to modify merger proposals so that the structural effects would conform with the levels specified in the guidelines.
For well over a decade, bank regulatory agencies have accepted divestitures as an antitrust remedy. In recent years, the Department of Justice has questioned the acceptability of certain divestitures proposed by acquiring firms, particularly in some of the so-called megamergers. In some cases, the Department selected specific branches and specified other terms and conditions for divestitures. There is, however, no evidence regarding the effectiveness of the divestiture remedy.
This study describes the evolution of the divestiture remedy, and provides some evidence regarding the efficacy of divestitures as a remedy for otherwise anticompetitive mergers. The findings are based upon an examination of the post-divestiture survival and market shares of entities (banks or offices as the case may be) divested because of competitive concerns. A statistical analysis is conducted to determine whether there is a relationship between market share performance and the size of buyers, the size of sellers, and whether the divested offices were owned by the acquiring or the acquired firm. Indeed, between 1972 and 1982, the Federal __________ 1. During this period of extensive acquisition activity by bank holding companies, the Federal Reserve Board was often concerned with factors such as the evolution of statewide structure. For example, in 1973 6. Of course, other factors such as the explicit inclusion of thrift institution deposits in the calculation of structural indexes (since 1985) and the consideration of economic evidence beyond concentration and market shares (such as potential competition) have, for many years, also served to lessen antitrust concerns with bank mergers. In analyzing any particular proposal, many mitigating factors may be considered, but the ultimate remedy, if needed, is divestiture. Federal Reserve Bulletin, vol. 68 (March 1982), p. 190 . Barnett was given up to nine months following consummation to complete the divestiture of nine branches which held 40 percent of Marine's assets. However, the order stated that:
"The Board wishes to emphasize that a divestiture, such as the one proposed by Applicant, should be completed prior to or concurrent with consummation of the proposal so as to avoid the existence of significant anticompetitive effects for even a short period of time. The Board expects that future bank holding company applicants will make every effort to arrange their proposals to comply with this policy." Therein the seller may specify which assets and liabilities are expected to convey to the purchaser. The sales price negotiated by the parties is presumably based upon some anticipated amount of "core deposits" that are expected to be retained by the buyer. In some instances, it is agreed that deposit and loan relationships of specific customers will not convey to the buyer. Other special conditions such as a seller's commitment not to solicit deposits or loan business of the offices being sold, and agreements not to establish new branches nearby for some specified time period may also be incorporated into agreements between buyers and sellers.
Stipulations regarding the retention and future employment of various branch personnel may also be agreed upon by the buyer and seller.
Although the Federal Reserve recognizes that all deposit and loan relationships may not convey along with the physical structure and the employees, it is anticipated that divested branches will retain sufficient business to constitute a viable competitive entity in the market. This expectation is based in large part on empirical evidence showing that location is a principal consideration of both individuals and small businesses in selecting convenient suppliers of 9 banking services.
The Federal Reserve has often expressed a preference for out-of-market buyers for divested offices, but has focused primarily upon the magnitude of the divestiture and its effects on structural indexes and resulting competitive conditions.
Usually, terms and conditions, including specific offices to be 10 divested, are left to the discretion of buyers and sellers.
In most instances, the divestiture involves offices of the firm being acquired, but it is not unusual for some branches of the applicant to be sold.
Department of Justice
Recent actions make it apparent that in the judgment of the The post-divestiture percentage changes in market shares of the sellers of divested branches are also examined. In addition, the changes in market shares of both the buyers and sellers a year after the divestiture are examined to provide information on deposit runoff from the divested entities.
V. Post-Merger Deposit Runoff at Divested Offices
An implicit assumption made by regulators in accepting certain levels of divestiture is that all of the deposits will convey to the purchasers of divested offices. However, it is reasonable to question whether the deposits of the divested entities will actually remain with the buyers, rather than revert to the sellers, during the period shortly following the sale. One obvious reason for this is that the banking organizations that divest offices do so because they have or will have (following the merger), a sizable pro forma market share. Furthermore, they will usually retain some offices that are within reasonable proximity to those being sold. For any number of reasons, some customers may choose to retain their banking relationship with the organization from which they had previously been obtaining banking services. Thus, deposits of such customers would likely flow from the divested branches to some of the market area branches retained by the sellers.
Bank regulatory and antitrust authorities would achieve very little from a public policy standpoint if sellers of divested offices regained most of their original market shares at the expense of the divested offices. It may also be the case that buyers and sellers have negotiated specific terms and conditions that would have an impact upon the anticipated competitive viability of divested 18 entities.
Even if the buyers, for example, purchase the divested offices at a discount because it is known that there will be substantial deposit run-off, the buyers and sellers, through compensation, may reach a satisfactory agreement, but public policy goals of the divestiture may not be achieved. Regulators, in most instances, have no knowledge of anticipated runoff, whereas the buyers and sellers may have reasonably accurate estimates.
Analysis of the data indicates that sixty, or 72.3 percent, of the eighty-three divested entities lost some market share during the first year after being purchased. Because the sellers of the branches in these markets retained sizable market shares, it might be expected that a good deal of the runoff would flow back to the sellers. Consequently, the sellers would be expected to gain market share during this same time period. However, analysis indicates that gains in market share by the sellers occurred in only nineteen of the sixty markets where the divested entities lost market share. In the other forty-one markets, both the buyers and the sellers lost market __________ 18. This process of negotiation by buyers and sellers is discussed in John J. Mingo and William F. Spinard, "Branch Divestitures: Valuation and Sales Strategies," Banking Expansion Reporter, vol. 3, no. 2 (January 16, 1984) .
share, suggesting that runoff does not always flow back to the sellers, but may go to other banks in the market. Another conclusion that can be reached is that not all, or not even the vast majority of divested entities experience significant deposit runoff. Indeed twenty-three, or 27.7 percent, of the eighty-three divested entities gained market share in the first year after sale.
VI. Survival of Divested Branches
From an antitrust or public policy standpoint, a question even more important than the degree of short-term deposit run-off experienced by divested offices is the longer-term competitive viability of these offices. If, indeed, convenience is the most important consideration to users of retail banking services, the divested branches can be expected to retain most of the original customers and perhaps eventually gain new ones. In the final analysis, the critical questions from an antitrust standpoint are first, whether divested branches continue to compete in their markets and second, whether they maintain their market shares. This section examines the survival of the divested branches.
The sample includes 210 offices that were divested between 1985 and 1992. The analysis is focused on divested entities, that is, one or more offices located in a particular local market. As shown in table 1, in forty-six instances, the divested entity was a single branch office and in twenty markets two offices were sold. In seventeen other markets more than two branches were divested.
An impressive finding from a competitive standpoint is that virtually all of the divested offices continued to operate throughout the entire observation period. Each of the forty-six single offices divested remained in operation over the entire period, which ranged from three to ten years. In those twenty markets where two branches were originally divested, only one of the forty branches was subsequently closed. However, two additional branches were opened, resulting in a net increase of one branch in that group. Overall, there were originally 210 branches divested in the eighty-three markets in the sample. At the end of the period, there was a net increase of ten branches in operation by the buyers. Branch closings occurred in only three of the eighty-three markets. In addition to the market noted above where one of two divested branches was closed, three branches in a twenty-six branch divested entity were closed, and two branches in an eight branch divested entity were closed. Thus, in all, sixteen new branches were opened and six were closed by the buyers of the 210 divested branches.
The evidence on branch survival strongly suggests that from an antitrust standpoint, divestitures have proven to be an effective device for dealing with the possible anticompetitive effects of bank mergers. Even if sellers had disposed of the least desirable offices from their own standpoint, the divested offices apparently remain competitively viable. In the next section, the competitive viability of the divested branches is further explored by examining their market share performance over the years following their purchase.
VII. Market Share Performance of Divested Entities
In the final analysis, the critical questions from an antitrust standpoint are first, whether buyers of divested branches continue to compete in their markets and second, whether they tend to maintain their market shares. The answer to the first question is very clear. Only six, or 2.9 percent of the 210 divested branches were subsequently closed, and those few closings occurred in markets where the buyers continued to operate other branches.
In this section, we analyze market share performance as The variable AM is included to control for the absolute size of the market share of the divested entity over the period under analysis. This is done because there is a higher likelihood that a small banking office or one with a small market share will experience a greater percentage change in deposit growth than a larger institution.
It is logical to assume that branches acquired by large banking organizations may be in a position to receive more financial and managerial support from the parent institution than would branches acquired by a small organization. Although there is generally a lack of empirical support for this notion in banking, it continues to receive the attention of the banking community and bank regulatory agencies. Large banking organizations are generally considered to be more formidable competitors than small organizations. To provide a test of this notion in the special case of divested entities, we include the variable, SB, which is the state market share of the buyer of the divested branches.
The variable MS, the remaining market share of the firm making the divestiture, is included to test whether the presence of the seller has a material effect on the success of the divested entities. As noted previously, the sellers in this study usually retained a significant presence in the markets where they were required to divest offices because of antitrust concerns. The magnitude of the seller's presence may be related to its ability to regain customers from the divested entities.
Although the regulatory agencies generally prefer that branches of the acquired firm be divested, applicants often choose to 21 divest their own branches.
The dummy variable, AD, is included to test whether divested branches that were owned by the acquired firm experience greater success than divested branches that were owned by the applicant. Since, unlike the acquired firm, the applicant always continues to operate in the market, it seems plausible that if its own offices are sold, some effort might be made to continue to service customers of the divested branches. In addition, some of the customers themselves may prefer to continue dealing with the same bank if there is another branch within reasonable proximity. Although there is no existing evidence regarding the performance of divested branches, the Department of Justice clearly prefers, and in some instances insists, that branches of the acquired or target firm, rather than those of the applicant, be divested. As noted previously, the Federal Reserve usually leaves the matter of branch selection to the discretion of the applicants. The dummy variable, DJ, is included to test whether branches selected by the DOJ have better postdivestiture deposit market share performance than those selected by applicants.
__________ 21. In the sample examined in this study, fifty of the divested entities were those of the acquired firm and thirty-three were those owned by the applicant. Regulatory agencies might thus consider the enhanced future prospects of branches sold to large firms as a mitigating factor when determining the magnitude of divestiture required.
__________
22. There is substantial variation in the market shares of the divested entities. The average market share divested was 10.24 percent with a range from 1.21 to 48.56 percent and standard deviation of 9.14 percent.
The MS variable, the retained market share of the seller, has a positive coefficient which is not statistically significant.
Apparently, sellers that retained large market positions are no more likely to successfully seek to gain back the customers of the divested branches than are firms with smaller retained market shares. This finding is consistent with the importance of switching costs for retail customers and with the importance of branch locations and convenience when customers choose providers of banking services.
The findings also show that the divested entities experienced greater competitive success if they were branches of the target firm rather than if they were those of the applicant. The AD variable was positive and statistically significant. This is not surprising when one considers that, after a merger, the target firm no longer exists and thus customers of its branches would not be able to migrate to a branch of their former bank. Such customers would have no real reason to switch branches unless they were very dissatisfied with the buyer of the branches because of the costs associated with switching, one of which would be some loss of convenience, which was probably a factor in the customers' original choice. In contrast, if an applicant divests its own branches, there would appear to be at least some customers who would choose to continue the relationship with their bank and would switch to another branch of that bank. This could be completely voluntary on the part of customer, or could be due to efforts made by the applicant.
The DJ variable, the dummy for divested entities in cases where the Department of Justice was involved in negotiating the divestiture agreement, is negative and statistically significant. This suggests that leaving the choice of branches to be divested to the discretion of applicants may be suitable from an antitrust standpoint.
This finding may seem somewhat inconsistent with our earlier finding that divested target firm branches fared better than applicants' divested branches, given the DOJ preference for the former. However, not all branches selected for divestiture by the DOJ belonged to the target firms, and many divested branches in cases where the DOJ did not become involved in negotiations, belonged to the 24 target firms.
X. Summary and Conclusions
To reduce uncertainty regarding the acceptability of bank mergers under the antitrust laws, the Federal Reserve Board, in the early 1980s, adopted the Department of Justice merger guidelines as the basis for providing the banking community with a merger screening device. After guidelines for identifying likely unacceptable mergers were established, the divestiture evolved as a mechanism through which denials of bank mergers based on competitive grounds could be virtually eliminated. The purpose of this study is to examine whether, from a public policy standpoint, divestitures have constituted an effective antitrust remedy. The analysis is based on a sample that includes most of the proposals approved subject to divestiture by the Federal Reserve between 1985 and 1992.
A number of findings emerge from the study. First, the divested branches have a remarkable survival record. Over 97 percent of the divested offices remained in operation over the entire period __________ 23. It is important to note, however, that deposits alone are not the primary concern of the DOJ, which focuses on the volume of services provided to small businesses. Branch selection by the DOJ may well be preferable from the standpoint of small business services, but that issue is not explored in this study.
24. Although the two variables, AD and DJ, are positively correlated, the correlation coefficient is only .441. studied. Moreover, some of the buyers of the divested branches opened additional offices in the same markets. This alone suggests that divestitures have generally provided an effective public policy remedy with respect to bank mergers.
An examination of the post-divestiture changes in the market shares of divested offices provides further support for the view that divestitures are an effective antitrust remedy. That is, the structural changes effected by divestitures tend to persist over time.
Although many of the buyers did experience some deposit run-off during the first year following purchase, approximately one-half appeared to regain and maintain their market shares in subsequent years. A statistical analysis also revealed that larger buyers of divested branches tended to improve their performance more than smaller buyers.
It was also found that divestiture of the target institutions' branches rather than those of applicants proved preferable from an antitrust standpoint. Divested branches in cases where the Department of Justice was involved in the negotiation of branch sales were, on average, not as successful as other divested branches. Thus, based on the retention of deposits, it appears that leaving most of the terms and conditions surrounding purchase agreements to the discretion of buyers and sellers has not impaired the competitive viability of divested entities.
